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The uprisings beginning in late 2010, known as the Arab Spring, shook the Middle East to its 
foundations. Yet the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan appeared to be a virtual oasis of calm in the 
midst of turmoil. In a volatile neighborhood, Jordanian stability remains nothing short of 
remarkable. But is Jordan an oasis or a mirage? 
Neither characterization seems entirely accurate: Jordan’s stability and security are not figments 
of the imagination, especially considering the revolutions, civil wars and endemic terrorism that 
seem to have afflicted most of the country’s neighbors. Yet the calm may not be sustainable, as 
Jordan confronts its own continuing struggles over reform and change; faces seemingly countless 
threats in terms of its internal and external security; and attempts to deal with its own economic 
crises and challenging energy needs. 
But even as Jordan confronts its domestic challenges, its regional setting presents an even deeper 
challenge. Jordan’s political geography, in short, seems to make every problem more difficult. 
To the north, Syria’s civil war rages on, while to the east, Iraq has seen rampant terrorism since 
the U.S.-led invasion of 2003 and intermittent insurgencies rising against the government in 
Baghdad. In both Syria and Iraq, large swaths of territory are now controlled by the self-declared 
Islamic State (IS, or as it is known in Jordan, Daesh), which ultimately has designs on Jordan 
too. 
To the west lie Israel and the Palestinian territories. While Jordan has maintained a peace treaty 
with Israel since 1994, it remains a cold peace at best—between the two countries’ governments 
but not their societies. Last summer’s Gaza war and other recent events have only made it that 
much harder for the Jordanian regime to maintain the treaty in the face of increased domestic 
anger over Israeli actions against Palestinians in Gaza, the West Bank and Jerusalem. 
To the south lies the only seemingly peaceful border, with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. But 
even as Jordan edges ever closer to the Saudis as allies, many Jordanians fear increased Salafi or 
Wahhabi influence on domestic politics. The rise of IS and the increasing activism of Jordan’s 
own Salafi movement have only added to those fears. 
This report will examine several key areas of concern in Jordanian politics, including foreign 
policy and regional relations, internal struggles over political reform, as well as social divisions, 
refugee crises and economic challenges facing the kingdom today. 
Security, Alliances and Regional Relations 
Unlike many regimes elsewhere in the world, Jordan’s security concerns aren’t hypothetical. A 
revolutionary version of the Arab Spring may not have emerged from within Jordan, but the 
revolutions, uprisings and civil wars of the country’s neighbors have increasingly pressed at its 
borders. 
Certainly the most urgent security threat to Jordan is the rise of IS in parts of both Syria and Iraq. 
More alarming for Jordanians was the spread of the movement to Jordan’s very borders, as IS 
militants took multiple posts on the border with Syria and then claimed territories across the Iraqi 
border as well, in Iraq’s Anbar province. Jordan responded by reinforcing both borders with 
additional forces and armored units. 
The kingdom also strengthened its already extensive ties with the militaries of the United States 
and the United Kingdom, as well as with their respective intelligence services, the CIA and MI6. 
Early in the Arab Spring, before the rise of IS, Amman had already permitted the deployment of 
several hundred U.S. troops in northern Jordan, along with U.S. F-16 fighter jets and Patriot 
missile defense batteries. All of this was originally agreed upon with the threat of Syrian 
President Bashar al-Assad’s military—and especially his chemical weapons—in mind. Today, 
those same forces, now augmented by an additional squadron of six French fighter jets, are 
positioned against IS rather than Assad. 
But in 2011 and 2012, at least, it was retaliation from Assad that the Jordanian regime feared 
most—specifically, retaliation for Jordanian support for “moderate” rebel forces aligned against 
the Assad regime. While details have been kept deliberately nebulous, some units of the Free 
Syrian Army (FSA) are believed to be receiving training and perhaps arms in Jordan. 
That in many ways encapsulates Jordan’s precarious position as the Syrian civil war spiraled out 
of control: It has tried to provide support to one side without being perceived in Damascus as 
doing just that. The kingdom has been under considerable pressure from its major allies—the 
U.S. and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)—to do more. But unlike the U.S. and the GCC 
states, Jordan shares a border with Syria, so the potential costs of any failures are a more 
immediate concern. Perhaps with that in mind, the Jordanian government has consistently called 
for a political, rather than a military, solution to the Syrian conflict. 
Jordan has therefore tried to maintain as low-key an approach as possible toward the Syrian war, 
although it is clearly not a neutral or disinterested party. But even four years into the war, and 
despite anger in Damascus over Amman’s position on the conflict, Jordanian-Syrian relations 
remain unbroken. At one point, the Jordanians grew tired of Syria’s vocal ambassador openly 
criticizing the Hashemite regime and abruptly sent him packing. But neither country cut off 
relations, and both regimes feel threatened by the rise of IS. 
More broadly, the Arab Spring, from the initial democratic protests to the civil wars and rise of 
IS, has rearranged regional alliances and alignments. For a small country like Jordan, alliances 
are a key factor in foreign policy and have been nothing less than the guarantors of national and 
regime security throughout the existence of the Hashemite Kingdom. Jordan has maintained 
intimately close relations with the United Kingdom and the European Union more generally, and 
especially with the U.S. Its military and intelligence services have close connections to their U.S. 
counterparts, and Jordan is one of the top recipients of U.S. foreign aid. The relationship is even 
close at a personal level; Jordan’s King Abdullah II and U.S. President Barack Obama are 
friends, and the king is a frequent visitor to the U.S. 
It is in regional terms, especially in inter-Arab relations, that we see more fluctuation and 
realignment over the years. Upon ascending the throne in 1999, King Abdullah made the repair 
of ruptured inter-Arab relations a priority. Jordan had been cut off from the main Arab sources of 
oil and aid due to its stance in 1990 over the Persian Gulf War. The Jordanians had actually 
adopted a neutral position, warning against the destabilizing effects of a war in the Gulf. But the 
defeat of Iraq by a U.S.-led coalition had destroyed Jordan’s main import and export trade 
partner, and wealthy oil monarchies like Saudi Arabia and Kuwait cut off Jordanian aid and oil 
and deported hundreds of thousands of Jordanian and Palestinian workers. The political and 
economic blow of that era has haunted many officials since, and King Abdullah has made it a 
priority to strengthen regional ties while trying to alienate no one. 
From 1999 onward, Jordan restored its ties to the Arab Gulf monarchies and has tried to 
strengthen them ever since. In 2011, as regimes fell in Tunisia and Egypt, the six monarchies of 
the GCC—Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates—began 
to play a more active foreign policy role, and even extended membership invitations to two more 
monarchies: Jordan and Morocco. Neither was a Gulf state or a rich oil economy, but both were 
predominantly Sunni Arab states led by relatively conservative monarchies with extensive ties to 
Western powers. 
Those invitations seem to have vanished at present, as the initial period of alarm passed. But new 
and different security threats have since emerged, so Jordanian security cooperation with these 
states remains extensive, and aid from the GCC has been vital in helping Jordan navigate the 
economic difficulties resulting from the Arab Spring. 
In 2012, as the Muslim Brotherhood rose to power in Egypt and Islamist forces seemed to be 
experiencing a resurgence across the region, Jordan and the GCC states alike grew worried about 
what these trends meant for them. In Jordan, the Muslim Brotherhood remains a legal and active 
organization, and it has been part of public life since the foundation of the state itself in 1946. 
The Brotherhood remains the largest and best-organized opposition group in Jordanian politics, 
and while it is a force for conservative Islamism, it is not a militant or jihadist organization. It 
has therefore maintained a kind of understanding with the monarchy over the years—sometimes 
in a fairly cooperative relationship of “loyal opposition,” sometimes in cold detachment. The 
latter mood better captures the regime-Islamist relations since the Arab Spring. 
The Brotherhood has boycotted the last several rounds of Jordanian elections and has been 
harshly critical of the regime-led reform process. Inspired by the successes of Islamist 
movements across the region, the movement seemed to feel in 2011-2013 that its time had come. 
But with the sudden reversal of fortune for Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood in July 2013 through an 
unusual combination of mass demonstrations and military coup d’etat, their Jordanian 
counterparts were in shock. The Hashemite regime, in contrast, seemed both relieved and 
overjoyed. Within 24 hours of the regime shift in Egypt, Jordan made clear its support for the 
new secular regime of Gen. Abdel-Fattah el-Sissi, arranging an immediate royal visit. King 
Abdullah was the first world leader to arrive in Cairo after the regime change, backing the el-
Sissi government and creating a warming in Egyptian-Jordanian relations that has continued ever 
since. 
Since 2013, an inter-Arab alignment of Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the UAE has grown 
steadily closer. These states have not just cooperated in foreign policy, but also to some extent in 
domestic policy. Each of these three key Jordanian allies has moved harshly against the Muslim 
Brotherhood, declaring the organization illegal, with Egypt in particular making positively 
draconian moves. Yet Jordan has, so far, avoided pressure from its allies to do the same. In 
contrast to their allies, the Jordanians have not moved against the Muslim Brotherhood itself. 
The organization remains active and legal, as it has throughout Jordanian history. But the 
relationship between the regime and the Brotherhood also remains cold and distrustful, with each 
seeing the other as having engaged in a kind of betrayal. 
Yet foreign policy may actually deepen the rift even further. Alliances and alignments are seen 
as so central to Jordanian foreign policy, and to Jordan’s security and economic interests, that 
criticism within domestic politics of Jordan’s key allies is now an arrestable offense. This was 
underscored in December 2014, when Jordanian security forces arrested the outspoken deputy 
leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, Zaki Bani Irshayd, not for statements or actions against the 
regime, but for Facebook posts harshly criticizing the UAE for its suppression of the Muslim 
Brotherhood. Irshayd was put on trial under Jordan’s recently strengthened counterterrorism law, 
which criminalized actions or comments that “harm” Jordan’s foreign relations. In January 2015, 
three more Muslim Brotherhood supporters were tried for harming relations with Egypt after 
criticizing the el-Sissi regime. 
Jordan’s revamped counterterrorism law also criminalizes online activity that is deemed to be 
supportive of militant or terrorist organizations. In addition, it was used to arrest almost 100 
people for raising the flag of IS during demonstrations by Jordanian Salafis, which took place in 
August 2014, especially in the southern city of Maan. 
Jordanian intelligence and police had already been monitoring Salafi activism closely, as Salafi 
jihadists crossed Jordan’s borders to fight against Assad in Syria, and later, to join groups like 
Jabhat al-Nusra and IS. By 2013, border forces became more stringent in preventing would-be 
jihadists from crossing the borders out of Jordan, but they were even more aggressive against 
those attempting to return, opening fire on any jihadi militants approaching Jordan’s Syrian or 
Iraqi borders. 
Jordan’s attempts to guarantee its own security have been very controversial at home. Many 
Jordanians do indeed support each key move, including the deployment of U.S. forces, jets and 
missile systems, seeing these as vital to Jordanian security and national defense. But many, 
perhaps even more, do not. Some argue that the Western powers, and especially the U.S. in light 
of the 2003 Iraq War, are the main culprits behind the destabilization of the region, and hence are 
the last forces that should deploy on Jordanian national soil. Others fear that too close a 
connection to Western powers, or even to the reactionary bloc that is the GCC, will trigger 
jihadist retaliation, not on Jordan’s borders, but within the kingdom itself. 
This is not an idle fear. Jordan has been the victim of jihadist terrorism before. On Nov. 9, 2005, 
jihadist suicide bombers affiliated with al-Qaida in Iraq attacked three hotels in Amman, killing 
60 people and injuring hundreds. It was a devastating moment for the Jordanian state and 
society, and one that has loomed like a shadow ever since. 
When Jordan agreed to play an active role in the U.S.-led coalition against IS, many Jordanians 
worried about similar terrorist acts again being visited on the kingdom by IS jihadists. This time, 
Jordan was playing a very public role, with Jordanian fighter jets even joining in a bombing 
campaign against IS strongholds. This role became crystal clear when a Jordanian pilot, Muadh 
al-Kassasbeh, was shot down and captured near Raqqa, Syria, considered the capital of IS. The 
capture of Kassasbeh, and the threat by IS to execute him, led to renewed debate within Jordan 
over the kingdom’s very controversial role in the anti-IS coalition. 
The ‘Arab Spring’ and Internal Reform Struggles 
In 2011, mass uprisings toppled Arab regimes in Tunisia and Egypt, and soon spread to Bahrain, 
Libya, Syria and Yemen. No two outcomes were quite alike. Revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt 
ousted their respective dictators relatively quickly, yet the post-revolutionary transitions soon 
went in radically different directions. In Yemen, a partial transfer of power was arranged via a 
negotiated exit for President Ali Abdullah Saleh, while in Bahrain, the counterrevolution seemed 
to be in full swing. Both the Libyan and Syrian revolutions turned into civil wars, with the 
former prompting NATO military intervention and the latter descending into a seemingly 
endemic conflict between regime and opposition that has drawn in various forms of direct and 
indirect foreign intervention. In the latter cases in particular, the original optimism and 
democratic impulses of the Arab Spring have taken a darker turn toward repression and violence. 
Throughout the years of the Arab Spring, Jordan maintained a moderate and seemingly stable 
position. The kingdom did not see revolution, civil war, insurgency or a coup d’etat. The 
Hashemite regime remained in place, and Jordan persevered as a regime, a state and a society. 
But that is not to say that nothing happened. 
In 2011 and 2012, protesters marched in Jordan too, with demonstrations sometimes reaching the 
thousands. The largest of them tended to emerge when multiple elements of political opposition 
all took to the streets: youth activists, Islamists—based heavily in Jordan’s very large Muslim 
Brotherhood movement—leftist and nationalist political parties, as well as trade unions and 
professional associations. In almost every case, however, Jordanian protesters called for reform, 
not revolution. Some wanted the regime to lead the reform process. Others wanted the regime to 
remain, but to take a few steps back in terms of its role in politics, devolving more power to 
elected bodies and allowing for greater democratization. 
In general, protesters’ demands touched on three large themes: the revival of a long-dormant 
political liberalization process; the restoration of the fuller economic and social safety net that 
had eroded in an era of privatization and other neoliberal economic reforms; and a serious effort 
to stamp out widespread corruption in public life. 
Jordan did not have millions of protesters occupying a central square, or a death toll from police 
brutality, but protesters gathered like clockwork every Friday for more than two years beginning 
in 2011. By 2013, these demonstrations began to taper off and shifted in size and focus. Many 
activists were disillusioned with the violent turns taken by the Arab Spring elsewhere, especially 
in Syria. The Syrian civil war had in fact divided many elements of the Jordanian opposition, 
with Islamists backing the rebel movements while secular leftist and nationalist political parties 
often backed Assad against his largely Islamist opponents. 
Broader trends across the region seemed to reinforce these opposition divisions. Non-Islamist 
protesters were alarmed by the rise of Islamist movements to power in Tunisia and Egypt. 
Jordanian Islamists, in turn, were at first inspired by this same turn of events, but then became 
alarmed by the failures and ousting of Islamist regimes in 2013 and 2014. 
Today, Jordan’s leadership has survived the Arab Spring, as least in the sense of avoiding its 
more violent and revolutionary manifestations. The Hashemite regime feels that this is due to its 
own efforts in responding to public demands. King Abdullah noted on many occasions that the 
Arab Spring was not a constraint, but an opportunity, a wake-up call to Arab regimes for reform 
and change. The king argued therefore that the strategic moment empowered would-be reformers 
to finally move against otherwise entrenched hardliners who opposed liberalization or other 
forms of political change. 
Four years after the start of the Arab spring, however, the regime and the opposition retain 
markedly different images of what exactly has transpired during this period. The regime argues 
that Jordan has, once again, demonstrated its exceptionalism and durability by adapting to 
volatile circumstances. The list of reforms includes changes to the constitution, electoral laws, 
political party laws and media laws, as well as the creation of a Constitutional Court, an 
Independent Electoral Commission to oversee national elections and an Anti-Corruption 
Commission. The most recent of these were held in 2013 and included open access to 
international election observers. The 2013 elections ushered in a new Parliament, which 
consulted with the regime about the naming of a new prime minister. It was a step short of 
explicitly parliamentary government, but the regime maintained that it was making deliberate 
and careful steps toward that eventual end. 
Opposition activists, in contrast, don’t disagree with the reality of the reforms listed above, but 
they do tend to disagree about their depth and whether they are meaningful or simply cosmetic 
changes. The monarchy, they argue, maintains most political power in the Jordanian system. 
Despite the list of reforms, the electoral law remains uneven in terms of representation among 
districts, and true parliamentary government remains a goal but not yet a reality. Perhaps more 
alarming for democracy activists, however, was the new law on media, press and publications, 
which extended government supervision to include online media, along with the revamped 
counterterrorism law, which included under its terrorism rubric online activism or perceived 
support for militant groups even in online posts. 
For many regime officials, and indeed many in Jordan’s security and intelligence services, the 
new laws are essential to the security of the kingdom, especially in light of the turmoil across 
Jordan’s borders. But democracy activists argue that national security concerns, both real and 
perceived, tend to be used to block greater reform, liberalization or democratization. They worry 
specifically about how—and against whom—these laws might be used. 
Shortly after the new media restrictions went into place, Jordan blocked hundreds of websites, 
reining in a proliferation of online news sites and tabloids that had riled many in the ruling elite. 
Several sites that vanished will likely not be missed, but some other more professional sites were 
also banned in this process, including the highly regarded 7iber.com (pronounced “Hiber”—
Arabic for “ink”). The 7iber site, run by an enclave of young supporters of reform and 
democracy, responded by changing their domain several times—7iber.com, 7iber.net, 
7iber.org—but each time the government found the new site and blocked it. Eventually, 7iber too 
complied with the new, more restrictive rules, became licensed and was once again accessible. 
But in many ways, the overall state of press and media freedom was more troubled in 2015 than 
it had been in 2011, at the start of the Arab Spring. 
In 2011, many young activists in Jordan were inspired and hopeful about democratic reform. But 
many have since come to believe that Jordan remains in stasis, with much fanfare over reforms, 
but little depth to the actual change. 
Others feel that the situation is actually worse than stasis—that Jordan has begun regressing as 
the public pressure for reform has subsided. Yet that doesn’t mean that these same activists are 
necessarily part of an organized opposition. Indeed, many young activists in Jordan are as 
disillusioned with the old opposition—whether Islamist, leftist or nationalist—as they are with 
the government. 
For that reason, some activists feel that the Arab Spring never hit Jordan at all. Others feel that it 
did in a reformist rather than revolutionary sense, but that the kingdom has since reverted to its 
pre-Arab Spring form. Regime supporters, in contrast, argue that Jordan’s story is a model for 
the region—a model of largely top-down reform launched by the regime itself. In this sense, and 
many others, Jordan is often compared to Morocco. 
Perhaps the main issue accounting for these very different readings of contemporary political life 
is the security situation itself. Historically, and indeed throughout the world, countless reform or 
democracy programs have been abandoned in the name of national security. Regime critics argue 
that this is happening again in Jordan—that the panic over the rise of IS and other security 
threats may be the final nail in the coffin of the reform process. 
The monarchy, the government, the security services and many Jordanians argue the opposite. 
Given its severe security concerns, they say, Jordan has proceeded as far along the reform path as 
is feasible at present. 
Refugees and Economic Challenges 
Whether the issue is reform, security or the economy, Jordanian domestic political debates are 
never entirely domestic. Jordan’s small size and weak, even dependent economy make the 
kingdom especially vulnerable to regional crises. At the outset of the Arab Spring, Jordan was 
already embroiled in its own economic crisis, which was then compounded by regional turmoil, 
not only in terms of regional violence, but also in the form of massive refugee flows into the 
kingdom. 
Syria’s revolution and civil war began deep in the south of the country, in Deraa, a border town 
just north of Ramtha, Jordan. As the Assad regime responded with extreme violence against 
unarmed protesters, hundreds began to flee across the border to Jordan. Those hundreds soon 
became thousands and eventually hundreds of thousands. 
Today, it is unclear how many Syrian refugees there actually are, since most are not in refugee 
camps but instead have made their way to cities like Amman. The Jordanian government has 
sometimes estimated that as many as 1.4 million Syrians may be in Jordan—a country of less 
than 7 million people. Of these, approximately 736,000 are refugees, with perhaps 20 percent of 
the refugees in camps. Jordan has worked closely with the U.N. High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) in established camps such as Zaatari near Mafraq, and has been reliant on 
international aid to get by on a daily basis. 
There is no way to overstate the depth of this refugee burden. It is greatest, of course, on the 
refugees themselves, especially the majority who are children and who may ultimately comprise 
a lost generation for Syria. But for host countries—especially Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey and 
Iraq—the burden is also overwhelming, with international pledges rarely matching actual funds 
needed for services, food, water and lodging. 
It is worth noting that no country has dealt with more waves of refugees over time than Jordan. It 
is estimated that perhaps half the Jordanian population is descended from waves of Palestinian 
refugees, especially following the 1948 and 1967 Arab-Israeli wars. But Jordan has also seen 
waves of Iraqi refugees in the various Gulf wars, including hundreds of thousands fleeing the 
violence that followed the U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003. Even some of Jordan’s 
prominent minority communities, such as the Circassians and the Chechens, are themselves the 
descendants of refugees who fled persecution in the Russian Empire. Refugee flows, in short, are 
not new to Jordan. But Jordan’s economy remains unable to cope with these latest refugee flows 
without extensive daily international support. 
The economy itself is also small and aid dependent. Unlike its GCC allies, Jordan was not 
blessed with extensive oil resources. It has few natural resources, aside from limited supplies of 
phosphates and potash. Jordan remains dependent on outside suppliers for its energy needs—
especially oil and natural gas—and even for its water supplies. This makes it even more 
vulnerable to times of regional tension. The kingdom has drafted long-term plans to try and 
create a more sustainable economic situation, including starting shale production within Jordan 
itself as well as the creation of a pipeline from Aqaba to the Gulf for liquefied natural gas, which 
requires good relations with Qatar. 
Jordan began a process of economic liberalization under the late King Hussein in 1989. This 
involved a series of neoliberal economic reforms, opening the Jordanian economy to greater 
trade and investment; austerity programs to deal with a bloated public sector; and the 
privatization of previously state-owned companies in industries from communications to 
transportation to construction. Under King Abdullah, the neoliberal economic agenda steadily 
accelerated and has been a major part of the regime’s economic development strategy. 
Jordan’s economic adjustment program has at times involved severe economic austerity 
measures, as part of a long-term IMF restructuring program. These, in turn, have at times 
triggered political unrest, including riots over the loss of subsidies for basic food items in 1989, 
1996 and most recently in November 2013. Today, despite regional turmoil and the refugee 
crises, the IMF has rated Jordan’s economy as stable. The kingdom is, in fact, almost the poster 
country for the world’s dominant economic institutions: the IMF, the World Bank and the WTO. 
Many in Jordan’s business community applaud this economic trajectory, but there is also no 
shortage of domestic critics, and this has even to some extent rearranged the normal structures of 
opposition in the kingdom. 
For decades, many observers have remarked on the importance of identity politics within Jordan, 
in particular the tendency for state institutions and the public sector to be dominated by East 
Bank Jordanians, while the private sector seemed to be dominated by Jordanians of Palestinian 
origin. As privatization has proceeded apace, shrinking the public sector and empowering the 
private sector, many historically bedrock pro-regime communities now feel left out of Jordan’s 
development plans. Tribal East Jordanians have historically been seen as the core supporters of 
the Hashemite regime, but with often jarring economic, social and political change, this is no 
longer always the case. 
When the 2011 uprisings rocked the Arab world, youth-based movements (known as “Herak” in 
Jordan) emerged throughout the kingdom, but most often in tribal East Jordanian communities 
like Dheban, Tafila and Maan. Many of these protesters felt that Jordan’s neoliberal reform 
process had gone too far, undermining the social safety net and harming their own prospects for 
jobs and livelihoods. Some Herak activists want to roll back privatization efforts and re-establish 
direct state support for their communities. But others have emphasized political reform and 
democratization, rather than economic change, as the key points to their agenda. Palestinians 
have also participated, but seemingly not in great numbers. 
Indeed, since identity politics has been used so often in the past as a divide-and-rule tactic, 
especially by the intelligence services, many Jordanians try to downplay their own roots, fearing 
that legitimate democratic activism will be manipulated by hardline anti-reform elements in the 
regime. The latter elements have a long history of attempting to label any mass activism as really 
Palestinian, or Islamist, or both—in each case questioning the national loyalty and patriotism of 
the participants. 
To be clear, Jordanian politics is not simply a contest between rich Palestinian business elites and 
poor disenfranchised tribal East Jordanians, nor is it the reverse: a contest between powerful East 
Jordanian elites versus poor disenfranchised Palestinians living in urban refugee camps. One can 
find all of the previous dimensions within Jordan, to be sure, but these are cross-cutting social 
cleavages. Jordanians of both Palestinian and East Bank origins can be found among Jordan’s 
poorest citizens, and also among its richest. 
Sometimes the dividing lines in Jordanian politics are between ethnic identities, sometimes 
between tribes, sometimes between ideologies—but the most important line is economic: 
between rich and poor. Still, the cynical invocation of identity politics nonetheless has a long 
history of success in terms of dividing potential opposition coalitions for greater economic or 
political change. 
Regional politics and economic crises have often mobilized—or divided—protest movements in 
Jordan. As noted above, Jordan’s various opposition elements were sharply divided over the 
Syrian war. But Israeli policies have sometimes had the opposite effect, uniting Jordanians of 
various ideological, ethnic and religious backgrounds. Israel’s Likud governments have in 
particular made this an unintended result of their hard-line policies. The bombardment of Gaza in 
the summer of 2014, for example, triggered broad-based demonstrations in support of Palestinian 
rights, bringing a seemingly dormant street opposition movement back to life. 
Even more recently, economic and energy issues triggered an even greater grassroots political 
mobilization, when the Jordanian government announced that it intended to solve part of its 
energy crisis by importing gas from Israel. Jordanian activists equated the gas deal with 
supporting Israeli occupation and urged the government not to follow through with it. The 
movement that followed soon blurred the usual dividing lines to include leftists and Islamists, 
parties and professional associations, Muslims, Christians and Jordanians of all ethnic 
backgrounds. The activists even triggered a vigorous debate in Parliament, which ultimately 
voted to urge the government to scrap the deal with Israel. 
It remains unclear whether the government and regime will follow through with the widely 
unpopular deal. It is possible that Jordan can look to other suppliers, such as Cyprus, or increase 
the pace of its own energy-development plans with Iraq and the various GCC states. But all these 
options are long-term, including the potential deal with Israel, so Jordan will still need to find 
short-term solutions for greater energy security in the interim. In the meantime, the global drop 
in oil and energy prices has at least eased the economic urgency, if not the political difficulty, of 
Jordan’s energy crisis. But in a broader sense—beyond energy needs alone—Jordan’s economy 
remains aid-dependent, and hence stable foreign relations continue to be vital to sustain the state 
and society. 
Conclusion 
At the onset of 2015, Jordan has survived the regional waves of change known as the Arab 
Spring. But the kingdom’s security situation, always precarious, seems to be even worse as 
Jordan’s neighbors remain unstable at best, or embroiled in endemic turmoil at worst. 
Yet so far Jordan has managed to muddle through. At home, both the regime and its critics 
remain concerned with security threats, reform struggles and economic and energy crises. Most 
Jordanians seem aware that their situation could, at any moment, change radically, and that their 
security, political stability and economic well-being remain deeply dependent on the actions of 
neighbors—both allies and enemies alike. While this is in some ways an alarming prospect, it 
has also been true in varying degrees since the kingdom’s independence in 1946. 
Jordan cannot control or solve the problems of its neighbors, but in 2015 and beyond, if the 
kingdom is to do more than muddle through, it will be vital for both government and opposition 
to move forward in achieving meaningful political and economic reform and energy security, and 
above all to emphasize inclusion for Jordanians of all walks of life in every phase of that process. 
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